Whether this will happen, I do not know! Yet in the essence of technology I see the first glimmering of a much deeper mystery, what I call the ‘Event’ [Ereignis]—from which you may gather that there can be no question whatsoever either of resistance to technology or of its condemnation. Rather, what is at issue is understanding the essence of technology and of the technological world. In my view, this cannot happen so long as philosophy remains within the subject-object relation. That means: from out of Marxism, the essence of technology cannot be understood.
Wisser: All your reflections are grounded in and culminate in that question which is the fundamental question of your philosophy, namely the ‘question of Being.’ You have repeatedly pointed out that you do not wish merely to add another thesis concerning Being to the previous ones. Precisely because Being has been determined in such diverse ways—as property, as possibility and actuality, as truth, indeed even as God—you ask after an intelligible accord; not, however, in the sense of an overarching synthesis, but rather as the question concerning the meaning of Being.
In what direction does your thinking prepare an answer to the question: Why are there beings at all rather than nothing?
Heidegger: Here I must answer two questions. First: the clarification of the question of Being. I believe there is a certain lack of clarity in the way you formulate the question. The title ‘question of Being’ is ambiguous. ‘Question of Being’ can mean, first, the question concerning beings as beings. In this question one determines what beings are. The answer to this question yields the determination of Being.
But the question of Being can also be understood in the following sense: upon what is every answer to the question concerning beings grounded? That is, wherein is the unconcealment of Being itself grounded? To take an example: the Greeks determine Being as the presencing of what is present.