the having-come-into-another-frame-of-mind, but rather the having-lostcomposure, being on the way from one state to another, the peculiar unrest that is given with πάθος itself in relation to φόβος characterized as ταραχή,210 “tumult,” “getting mixed up.”
These determinations, and particularly the last—that προαίρεσις is βεβαίως—are “not ascribed” to a τέχνη.211 Only real concrete knowledge comes into play in τέχνη. What I am as far as being a decent guy plays no role in shoemaking. In relation to a certain commonality between τέχνη and πρᾶξις on account of the determination of the εἰδέναι,212 Aristotle stresses the preeminent significance of προαίρεσις and of βεβαίως. “The πράγματα that a σώφρων or δίκαιος should have been able to do are addressed as proper and composed πράγματα [we do not have categories for this: the new concrete situation that I created through my πρᾶξις—phenomenon of the concrete situation—the new being-positioned toward something that Aristotle designates as πράγματα]. However, proper and σώφρων is not he who [because of some accident] does what is proper and just, but rather he who shows concern for the concrete situation in the same way as do those who are just and composed.”213 This is a jab at the sophists and the greater part of human beings, who believe that one accomplishes something for ethical action by hashing over ethics-related conflicts or by moralizing. ἀλλ’ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ᾽ οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσιν τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ᾽ οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.214 “Most do not show concern for this [being-προαιρούμενος-βεβαίως], but instead they resort to babble and believe themselves, thereby, to philosophize and to be serious in the right manner. They resemble those who, while listening carefully to the doctor [and talking things over with him], nonetheless do nothing to follow his orders. Just as these others do not become healthy by sharing concern in this manner, neither do they who only moralize appropriate genuine existence for themselves [except in conversation].” What is characteristic is the sharp contrast between λέγειν about ethics-related problems and real philosophizing—an advance against the misuse of Socratic method in the claim that he understood Socrates correctly, and this will not easily be contested.
β. Ἀρετή as μεσότης
The relation of ἕξις and ἀρετή will be made clearer in order to understand, on that basis, how ἕξις itself can be the how of our comportment toward the
210. Rhet. Β 4, 1382 a 21.
211. Eth. Nic. Β 3, 1105 b 1: οὐ συναριθμεῖται.
212. Eth. Nic. Β 3, 1105 b 1 sq.
213. Eth. Nic. Β 3, 1105 b 5 sqq.: τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ τοῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτως πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν.
214. Eth. Nic. Β 3, 1105 b 12 sqq.