the preliminary indication for the analysis of individual πάθη themselves, insofar as these are to be considered: (1) with respect to the world in which the one in question finds himself, the environing world of living things; (2) with respect to the mode of disposition, comporting oneself toward the shared world; (3) how one oneself must be, in what state of mind one oneself must be, in order to be befallen by these or those πάθη.
A characteristic determination of the πάθη that we have not discussed hitherto is that every πάθος, every being-taken “follows,” ἕπεται, a definite disposition, but not in the temporal sense. A ἡδονή or λύπη is there, at one with the πάθος at each moment. This determination of the being-co-given of this disposition at each moment is so fundamental that Aristotle says that πάθος itself is a ἡδονή or λύπη. We must flesh out this determination more completely.
Aristotle treats ἡδονή in Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7 (Η), Chapters 12–15, and in Book 10 (Κ), Chapters 1–5. There is also Rhetoric, Book 1 (Α), Chapter 11. I will keep to the part in Book 10 for this interpretation. Here, I will only give the main theses of this analysis of ἡδονή.
The basic determination of ἡδονή is seen in Book 10, Chapter 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics: ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστιν τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ’ αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ.329 “Perhaps there is a being-possibility, τι φυσικὸν, even in foul beings, in what is inferior, which belongs to their being, that is better than they are in themselves [namely, the φαῦλοι], which they are after as οἰκεῖον ἀγαθόν, the being with which they genuinely find their end.” This means nothing other than that in all beings that are alive there lies the determination that it is after genuine being-therecompletedness. Every living thing is to a certain degree tendentious; it has the tendency toward being as being-completed.
ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ’ ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ’ ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ἡδονὴν διώκουσιν τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ᾽ ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον.330 “All things pursue a ἡδονή,” a disposition, and for the most part, “not those things that they believe they are striving for, not what they say matter to them, but rather they are all after the same thing.” What matters to them is to live. Beings, as living, are the sort of beings in whose being being-there matters to them. Θεῖον, for Aristotle, is nothing religious: θεῖον as the genuine being of being-always. Thus it can already be seen that ἡδονή is a determination of living things that is given with living-being as such. More precisely, ἡδονή is nothing other than a fundamental determination of being-inthe-world, insofar as being-in-the-world is the sort of being that I at the same time have—“having” is a pale expression for “being aware of.” Ἡδονή, finding oneself, is that in which I have an explanation as to my being-in-the-world: I
329. Eth. Nic. Κ 2, 1173 a 4 sq.
330. Eth. Nic. Η 14, 1153 b 29 sqq.