fulfillment of seeing—it is not a result of these circumstances, but rather the other way around. This possibility of finding-oneself-thus-and-so is grounded in my being as being-in-the-world, not a result of determinate circumstances, and consequently in his determination of ἡδονή, Aristotle can directly identify it with ζωή, “living.” The sentence, πάντες ἐφίενται ἡδονῆς, means nothing other than πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ ζῆν,338 so that in its being it depends on being-there. And so, finally, the question arises as to “whether we grasp life on account of finding-ourselves, or we grasp finding-ourselves, ἡδονή, on account of life; at the moment, this question is set aside.”339 Aristotle resolves this in the subsequent chapters of Book 10.
The genuine being of human beings, the highest being-possibility, lies in θεωρεῖν—the possibility of being there in the most radical sense.340 Ἡδονή is, put succinctly, nothing other than the determination of the presentness of being-in-the-world, which is there in finding-oneself as such. In connection with this determination of ἡδονή, I will briefly discuss how what is said about θεωρεῖν is to be understood. One must give up the definition of traditional psychology, which apprehends λύπη and ἡδονή as annexed to psychological processes. Ἡδονή is always aimed at living as being-in-the-world. Only in this way is it intelligible how Aristotle characterizes the various πάθη. With what justification is φόβος apprehended as λύπη, as a determinate disposition that is determined by being-toned-down-in-attunement? We have a distinctive basic structure: being-there, insofar as it is living, is always being-there at the moment; there is no being-there in general. Being-there is always: I am, not a being that is, but rather one that I am, and which at the same time has the possibility of being the sort of being that one is. Corresponding to the particularity of being-there, every disposition is always a definite one, for there is no finding-oneself in general; every finding-oneself is thus and so. Every ἡδονή is a definite one, as is every λύπη.
In the context of the definition of the πάθη, it is notable that ἡδονή is said to “be there also,” ἕπεται.341 Closer consideration shows that the co-being-there of ἡδονή means nothing other than the co-being-there of being-there itself that is befallen by a definite πάθος. The ἡδονή as disposition is the mode of having-itself of a being that is there. Already, living is thereby characterized as being-in-the-world, living as being-in. The possibility arises that such a being that orients itself also has itself in a certain way. We must refrain from orienting the having-itself toward reflection. Reflection is but a certain outré form in which being-there is conscious of itself. From that perspective, one can never come
338. Eth. Nic. Κ 4, 1175 a 10 sqq.: ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθείη τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται [ . . . ]. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται.
339. Eth. Nic. Κ 4, 1175 a 18 sq.: πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἱρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι.
340. Cf. Eth. Nic. Κ 7, 1177 a 12 sqq.
341. Rhet. Β 1, 1378 a 20 sqq.