their validity, relate necessarily if only pre-ontologically to the being of beings. This, however, does not mean that they already explicitly encroach upon the domain of ontology.
Our question aims at the objectification of being as such, at the second essential possibility of objectification, in which philosophy is supposed to constitute itself as science.
Being is familiar in the Dasein' s factical existence—whether scientific or pre-scientific—but the factical Dasein is disoriented with reference to it. Beings are not only familiar but present, right on hand. The Dasein comports itself directly only to beings, for which the understanding of being is controlling. Fundamentally the objectification of being is always possible, since being is in some way unveiled. But the direction of the possible projection of being as such is too doubtful, indefinite, and insecure to gather it as an object expressly from this projection. After our earlier discussions, no further allusions are needed to make clear that at first and for a long time original temporality, not to say Temporality, and hence that upon which we have projected being in order to make being the object of Temporal interpretation, remains hidden. But it is not only temporality that is concealed although something like time always announces itself; even more well-known phenomena, like that of transcendence, the phenomena of world and being-in-the-world, are covered over. Nevertheless, they are not completely hidden, for the Dasein knows about something like ego and other. The concealment of transcendence is not a total unawareness but, what is much more fateful, a misunderstanding, a faulty interpretation. Faulty interpretations, misunderstandings, put much more stubborn obstacles in the way of authentic cognition than a total ignorance. However, these faulty interpretations of transcendence, of the basic relationship of the Dasein to beings and to itself, are no mere defects of thought or acumen. They have their reason and their necessity in the Dasein's own historical existence. In the end, these faulty interpretations must be made, so that the Dasein may reach the path to the true phenomena by correcting them. Without our knowing where the faulty interpretation lies, we can be quietly persuaded that there is also a faulty interpretation concealed within the Temporal interpretation of being as such, and again no arbitrary one. It would run counter to the sense of philosophizing and of every science if we were not willing to understand that a fundamental untruth dwells with what is actually seen and genuinely interpreted. The history of philosophy bears witness how, with regard to the horizon essentially necessary for them and to the assurance of that horizon, all ontological interpretations are more like a groping about than an inquiry clear in its method. Even the basic act of the constitution of ontology, of philosophy, the objectification of being, the projection of being upon the horizon of its understandability, and precisely this