which circumspection is "absorbed" must remain nonthematic for that circumspection and all the more so for a noncircumspect, "thematic" abstract comprehension. The condition for the possibility of what is at hand not emerging from its inconspicuousness is that the world not announce itself. And this is the constitution of the phenomenal structure of the being-in-itself of these beings.
Privative expressions such as inconspicuousness, unobtrusiveness, and nonobstinacy tell of a positive phenomenal character of the being of what is initially at hand. These negative prefixes express the character of keeping to itself of what is at hand. That is what we have in mind with being-in-itself which, however, we ''initially" typically ascribe to things objectively present as that which can be thematically ascertained. When we are primarily and exclusively oriented toward that which is objectively present, the "in itself" cannot be ontologically explained at all. However, we must demand an interpretation if the [76] talk about "in-itself" is to have any ontological importance. Mostly one appeals ontically and emphatically to this in-itself of being, and with phenomenal justification. But this ontic appeal does not already fulfill the claim of the ontological statement presumably given in such an appeal. The foregoing analysis already makes it clear that the beingin- itself of innerworldly beings is ontologically comprehensible only on the basis of the phenomenon of world.
If, however, world can appear in a certain way, it must be disclosed in general. World is always already predisclosed for circumspect heedfulness together with the accessibility of innerworldly beings at hand. Thus, world is something "in which" ["worin"] Dasein as a being always already was, and world is that to which Dasein can always only come back whenever it explicitly moves toward something in some way.
According to our foregoing interpretation, being-in-the-world signifies the unthematic, circumspect absorption in the references constitutive for the handiness of the totality of useful things. Taking care of things always already occurs on the basis of a familiarity with the world. In this familiarity Dasein can lose itself in what it encounters within the world and be numbed by it. With what is Dasein familiar? Why can the worldly character of innerworldly beings appear? How is the referential totality [Verweisungsganzheit] in which circumspection "moves" to be understood more precisely? When this totality is broken, the presence of beings is thrust to the fore.
In order to answer these questions which aim at working out the phenomenon and problem of worldliness, a concrete analysis of the structures in whose context our questions are being asked is required.