of level and genuineness. Publicness obscures everything, and then claims that what has been thus covered over is what is familiar and accessible to everybody.
The they is everywhere, but in such a way that it has always already stolen away when Dasein presses for a decision. However, because the they presents every judgment and decision as its own, it takes the responsibility of Dasein away from it. The they can, as it were, manage to have "them" constantly invoking it. It can most easily be responsible for everything because no one has to vouch for anything. The they always "did it," and yet it can be said that "no one" did it. In the everydayness of Dasein, most things happen in such a way that we must say "no one did it."
In this way, the they disburdens Dasein in its everydayness. Not [128] only that; but disburdening it of its being, the they accommodates Dasein in its tendency to take things easily and make them easy. And since the they constantly accommodates Dasein by disburdening its being [Seinsentlastung], it retains and entrenches its stubborn dominance.
Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The they, which supplies the answer to the who of everyday Dasein, is the nobody to whom every Dasein has always surrendered itself, in its being-among-one-another.
In these characteristics of being which we have laid out—everyday being-among-one-another, distantiality, averageness, leveling down, publicness, disburdening of one's being, and accommodation—lies the initial "constancy" of Dasein. This constancy pertains not to the enduring objective presence of something, but to the kind of being of Dasein as being-with. Existing in the modes we have mentioned, the self of one's own Dasein and the self of the other have neither found nor lost themselves. One is in the manner of dependency and inauthenticity. This way of being does not signify a lessening of the facticity of Dasein, just as the they as the nobody is not nothing. On the contrary, in this kind of being Dasein is an ens realissimum, if by "reality" we understand being [Sein] that has the character of Dasein.
Of course, the they is as little objectively present as Dasein itself. The more openly the they behaves, the more slippery and hidden it is, but then too the less is it nothing at all. To the unprejudiced anticontological "eye," it reveals itself as the "most real subject" of everydayness. And if it is not accessible like an objectively present stone, that is not the least decisive with regard to its kind of being. One may neither decree prematurely that this they is "really" nothing, nor profess the opinion that the phenomenon has been interpreted ontologically if one "explains" it as the result of the objective presence of several subjects which one has put together in hindsight. On the