contrary, the elaboration of the concepts of being must be guided by these indubitable phenomena.
Nor is the they something like a "universal subject" which hovers over a plurality of subjects. One could understand it this way only if the being of "subjects" is understood as something unlike Dasein, and if these are regarded as factually objectively present cases of an existing genus. With this approach, the only possibility ontologically is to understand everything which is not a case of this sort in the sense of genus and species. The they is not the genus of an individual Dasein, [129] nor can it be found in this being as an abiding quality. That traditional logic also fails in the face of these phenomena, cannot surprise us if we consider that it has its foundation in an ontology of objective presence-an ontology which is still crude. Thus, it fundamentally cannot be made more flexible no matter how many improvements and expansions might be made. These reforms of logic, oriented toward the "humanistic sciences," only increase the ontological confusion.
The they is an existential and belongs as a primordial phenomenon to the positive constitution of Dasein. It has, in turn, various possibilities of concretion as a characteristic of Dasein. The extent to which its dominance becomes penetrating and explicit may change historically.
The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic self, that is, the self which has explicitly grasped itself. As the they-self, Dasein is dispersed in the they and must first find itself. This dispersion characterizes the "subject" of the kind of being which we know as heedful absorption in the world encountered as closest. If Dasein is familiar with itself as the they-self, this also means that the they prescribes the nearest interpretation of the world and of being-in-the-world. The they itself, for the sake of which Dasein is every day, articulates the referential context of significance. The world of Dasein frees the beings encountered for a totality of relevance which is familiar to the they in the limits which are established with the averageness of the they. Initially, factical Dasein is in the with-world, discovered in an average way. Initially, "I" "am" not in the sense of my own self, but I am the others in the mode of the they. In terms of the they, and as the they, I am initially "given" to "myself." Initially, Dasein is the they and for the most part it remains so. If Dasein explicitly discovers the world and brings it near, if it discloses its authentic being to itself, this discovering of "world" and disclosing of Dasein always comes about by clearing away coverings and obscurities, by breaking up the disguises with which Dasein cuts itself off from itself.
With this interpretation of being-with and being one's self in the they, the question of the who in the everydayness of being-with-one-another is answered. These considerations have at the same time given