discloses Dasein in its thrownness and, initially and for the most part, in the mode of an evasive turning away.
From this we can already see that attunement is far removed from anything like finding a psychical condition. Par from having the character of an apprehension which first turns itself around and then turns back, all immanent reflection can find "experiences" only because the there is already disclosed in attunement. "Mere mood" discloses the there more primordially, but it also closes it off more stubbornly, than any not-perceiving.
Bad moods [Verstimmung] show this. In bad moods, Dasein becomes blind to itself, the surrounding world of heedfulness is veiled, the circumspection of taking care is led astray. Attunement is so far from being reflected upon that, in the unreflected devotion to and giving in to the "world" of its heedfulness, it assails Dasein. Mood assails. It comes neither from "without" nor from "within," but rises from being-in-the-world itself as a mode of that being. But thus by negatively contrasting attunement with the reflective apprehension of the "inner," we arrive at a positive insight into its character of disclosure. Mood has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first [137] makes possible directing oneself toward something. Being attuned is not initially related to something psychical, it' is itself not an inner condition which then in some mysterious way reaches out and leaves its mark on things and persons. In this the second essential characteristic of attunement shows itself. It is a fundamental existential mode of the equiprimordial disclosedness of world, Dasein-with and existence because this disclosure itself is essentially being-in-the-world.
Besides these two essential determinations of attunement just explicated, the disclosure of thrownness and the actual disclosure of the whole of being-in-the-world, we must notice a third, which above all contributes to a more penetrating understanding of the worldliness of the world. We said earlier3 that the world already disclosed lets innerworldly things be encountered. This prior disclosedness of the world which belongs to being-in is also constituted by attunement. Letting something be encountered is primarily circumspective, not just a sensation or staring out at something. Letting things be encountered in a circumspect heedful way has—we can see this now more precisely in terms of attunement—the character of being affected or moved. But being affected by the unserviceable, resistant, and threatening character of things at hand is ontologically possible only because being-in as such is existentially determined beforehand in such a way that what it encounters in the world can matter to it in this way. This mattering to it is grounded in attunement, and as attunement it has disclosed
3. Cf. § 18.