everydayness. But this plunge remains concealed from it by the way things have been publicly interpreted so that it is interpreted as 11getting ahead" and "living concretely."
The kind of movement of plunging into and within the groundlessness of inauthentic being in the they constantly tears understanding away from projecting authentic possibilities, and drags it into the tranquillized supposition of possessing or attaining everything. Since the understanding is thus constantly torn away from authenticity and dragged into the tl1ey (altl1ough always witl1 a sham of authenticity), the movement of falling prey is characterized by turbulence. [179]
Not only does falling prey determine being-in-the-world existentially; at the same time turbulence reveals the character of throwing and the movement of thrownness which can force itself upon Dasein in its attunement. Not only is thrownness not a "finished fact," it is also not a self-contained fact. The facticity of Dasein is such that Dasein, as long as it is what it is, remains tossed about [im Wurf] and sucked into the turbulence of the they's inauthenticity. Thrownness, in which facticity can be seen phenomenally, belongs to Dasein, which is concerned in its being about that being. Dasein exists factically.
But now that falling prey has been exhibited, have we not set forth a phenomenon which directly speaks against the definition in which the formal idea of existence was indicated? Can Dasein be conceived as a being whose being is concerned with potentiality for being if this being has lost itself precisely in its everydayness and "lives" away from itself in falling prey? Falling prey to the world is, however, phenomenal "evidence" against the existentiality of Dasein only if Dasein is posited as an isolated I-subject, as a self-point from which it moves away. Then the world is an object. Falling prey to the world is then reinterpreted ontologically as objective presence in the manner of innerworldly beings. However, if we hold on to the being of Dasein in the constitution indicated of being-in-the-world, it becomes evident that falling prey, as the kind of being of this being-in, represents the most elemental proof for the existentiality of Dasein. In falling prey, nothing other than our potentiality for being-in-the-world is the issue, even if in the mode of inauthenticity. Dasein can fall prey only because it is concerned with understanding, attuned being-in-the-world. On the other hand, authentic existence is nothing which hovers over entangled everydayness, but is existentially only a modified grasp of everydayness.
The phenomenon of falling prey does not give something like a "night view" of Dasein, a property occurring ontically which might serve to round out the harmless aspect of this being. Falling prey reveals an essential, ontological structure of Dasein itself. Far from determining its nocturnal side, it constitutes all of its days in their everydayness.