183 I.VI
Being and Time

[vereinzelt], but as being-in-the-world. Being-in enters the existential "mode" of not-being-at-home [Un-zuhause]. The talk about "uncanniness" ["Unheimlichkeit"] means nothing other than this.

Now, however, what falling prey, as flight, is fleeing from becomes phenomenally visible. It is not a flight from innerworldly beings, but precisely toward them as the beings among which taking care of things, lost in the they, can linger in tranquillized familiarity. Entangled flight into the being-at-home of publicness is flight from not-being-at-home, that is, from the uncanniness which lies in Dasein as thrown, as being-in-the-world entrusted to itself in its being. This uncanniness constantly pursues Dasein and threatens its everyday lostness in the they, although not explicitly. This threat can factically go along with the complete security and self-sufficiency of the everyday way of taking care. Anxiety can arise in the most harmless situations. Nor does it have any need for darkness, in which things usually become uncanny to us more easily. In the dark there is emphatically "nothing" to see, although the world is still "there" more obtrusively.

If we interpret the uncanniness of Dasein existentially and ontologically as a threat which concerns Dasein itself and which comes from Dasein itself, we are not asserting that uncanniness has· always already been understood in factical anxiety in this sense. The everyday way in which Dasein understands uncanniness is the entangled turning away which "dims down" not-being-at-home. The everydayness of this fleeing, however, shows phenomenally that anxiety as a fundamental kind of attunement belongs to Dasein's essential constitution as being-in-the-world, which, as an existential, is never objectively present, but is itself always in the mode of factical Dasein, that is, in the mode of an attunement. Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein, not the other way around. Not-being-at-home* must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon.

And only because anxiety always already latently determines being-in-the-world, can being-in-the-world, as being together with the "world" taking care of things and attuned, be afraid. Fear is anxiety which has fallen prey to the "world." It is inauthentic and concealed from itself as such.

Factically, the mood of uncanniness remains for the most part [190] existentielly uncomprehended. Moreover, with the dominance of falling prey and publicness, "real" ["eigentliche"] anxiety is rare. Often, anxiety is "physiologically" conditioned. This fact is an ontological problem in its facticity, not only with regard to its antic causes and course of development. The physiological triggering of anxiety is possible only because Dasein is anxious in the very ground of its being.


* (Ex-proprialfon [Enteignis)).


Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)