in what is expressed. What is expressed becomes, so to speak, an innerworldly thing at hand that can be taken up and spoken about further. Because the discoveredness has been preserved, what is expressed (what is thus at hand) has in itself a relation to any beings about which it is a statement. Discoveredness is always a discoveredness of .... Even when Dasein repeats what has been said, it comes into a being toward the very beings that have been discussed. But it is and believes itself exempt from a primordial repetition of the act of discovering.
Dasein does not need to bring itself to beings in "original" experience, but it nevertheless remains in a being toward these beings. Discoveredness is appropriated to a large extent not by one's own discovering, but by hearsay of what has been said. Absorption in what has been said belongs to the kind of being of the they. What is expressed as such takes over the being toward those beings discovered in the statement. But if they are to be explicitly appropriated with regard to their discoveredness, this means that the statement should be shown to be one that discovers. But the statement expressed is something at hand, in such a way that, as preserving discoveredness, it has in itself a relation to the beings discovered. To demonstrate that it is something that discovers, means to demonstrate how the statement in which discoveredness is preserved is related to these beings. The statement is something at hand. The beings to which it has a discovering relation are innerworldly things at hand or objectively present. Thus the relation presents itself as something objectively present. But this relation lies in the fact that the discoveredness preserved in the statement is always a discoveredness of .... The judgment "contains something valid for the objects" (Kant). But the relation itself now acquires the character of objective presence by getting switched over to a relation between objectively present things. Discoveredness of ... becomes the objectively present conformity of something objectively present, of the statement expressed, to something objectively present, the being spoken about. And if this conformity is then viewed only as the relation between objectively present things, that is, if the kind of being of the terms of the relation is understood without differentiation as merely objectively present things, then the relation shows itself as the objectively present conformity of two objectively present things.
When the statement has been expressed [Ausgesprochenheit], the discoveredness [225] of beings moves into the kind of being of innerworldly things at hand. But to the extent that in this discoveredness, as a discoveredness of . . . , a relation to things objectively present persists, discoveredness (truth) itself in its turn becomes an objectively present relation between objectively present things (intellectus and res).
The existential phenomenon of discoveredness, which is based on the disclosedness of Dasein, becomes an objectively present property