This being-in-an-open-expanse is what Being and Time called (Heidegger even adds: “very awkwardly and in an unhelpful way”) Dasein.
Dasein must be understood as being-the-clearing. The Da is namely the word for the open expanse.
We can see clearly here that consciousness is rooted in Dasein, and not the other way around.
Consciousness and Dasein [Bewußtsein und Dasein]: both words contain the verb “being” [Sein]. Today’s seminar closes with the question: what is the meaning of being in consciousness and Dasein? This is the task for tomorrow.
II
Today’s session, Friday September 7, 1973, begins with the reading of the protocol.
Thereafter, Heidegger notes that many additions could be made to what was discussed the first day. But his concern in this seminar is something quite other. This is why he will restrict himself to two observations, with the goal of avoiding any over-simplification.
With respect to Kant, mention was made yesterday of an abstract deduction of categories. Heidegger questions: is there not in the Kantian doctrine something more and other than abstraction and deducability, in regard to the ways in which these are understandable and perceivable? Jean Beaufret mentions here the “schematism.” In the schematism, Kant brings the categories and time into a relation, which is—Heidegger says in passing—the Kantian way of discussing being and time.
With respect now to Husserl, Heidegger asks in what context the Logical Investigations come to categorial intuition. It is important to note that it is not in the context of an elaboration of the problem of categories—that is, the metaphysical problem of being. On the contrary, the relation of analogy between understanding and sensibility forms this context, each understood in that unity where the constitution of the object as object of experience becomes possible. It is thus a problematic of the theory of experience—through which Husserl again continues the Kantian heritage.
Within this context, Heidegger emphasizes, categorial intuition appears without in any way arising from an explicit ontological thematic.
These two remarks, as we can see, rectify yesterday’s discussion, or better, they prevent us from understanding it in a unilateral fashion. The fact that in Kant the categories are deduced in no way implies that the categorial is abstracted in isolation from any possible “concreteness.” The fact that the categorial is immediately and concretely