and through in this telling refusal that announces, this telling announcement that refuses.
We are thus asking about what it is that this fundamental attunement of profound boredom properly and really gives us to question whenever we ask: Whence the necessity of this relation between 'expanse' and 'extremity', between horizon and moment of vision, between world and individuation, and why does it arise? What kind of 'and' is it that links these terms? Why must that expanse of the entrancing horizon ultimately be ruptured by the moment of vision? And why can it be ruptured only by this moment of vision, so that Dasein attains its existence proper precisely in this rupture? Is the essence of the unity and structural linking of both terms ultimately a rupture? What is the meaning of this rupture within Dasein itself? We call this the finitude of Dasein and ask: What does finitude mean? Only with this question have we attained the question that fully gains a purchase upon what it is that is trying to voice itself in that fundamental attunement. Is it not the finitude of Dasein that resonates in the fundamental attunement of profound boredom and attunes us through and through?
At the very beginning of our lecture course we simply posed, in a rather arbitrary and violent fashion, those three questions which the fundamental attunement of profound boredom leads us to ask: what is world?, what is finitude?, what is individuation? But now the matter is somewhat clearer. These questions do not arise from books, they have not been culled by adaptation from a variety of philosophical schools, nor have they merely been repeated in obeisance to a trivialized metaphysical tradition. On the contrary, they now betray their possibility, i.e., their necessity in the need of our Dasein. Only when these questions are rooted in the place from which we now see them arising, and only when they remain rooted there, do they represent genuine questions. Yet if they really are genuine in this way, then they are not new. However, if they are not new, they are not old either. Neither new nor old, these questions are essential questions. In what is essential, however, everything associated with mere striving after originality or-what amounts to the same but is even more suspect-everything that seeks to contest an originality that was never attempted in the first place, has also become a matter of irrelevance. The question which continues to face us is simply whether or not we are capable of experiencing, or at least releasing, the liberating power harbored within these questions as questions.
Our three questions were posed in the following order: [ l .] What is world? [2.] What is finitude? [3.] What is individuation? We have developed them in such a way, however, that finitude has emerged as the third and pressing question. Yet third in what sense? As the unifying and original root of the other two. Because this question is the most originary, the one which holds together the other two, we place it in the middle of the series. This is intended to indicate