whereas λόγoς is not extended in space. [128] What the expression means is: the proposition is where truth originally and properly belongs. The proposition is what makes truth possible as such. When this thesis is asserted and taken unquestioningly as the basis of every explanation of truth, it is most often accompanied by a second thesis, one concerned with content—namely, that the thesis about the proposition as the place of truth was first enunciated by Aristotle. And usually this second thesis is connected with a third, namely, that Aristotle was the one who first determined the concept of truth—as the correspondence of thought with things. However (so this thesis usually affirms), since this concept of truth cannot stand up against critical reflection, Aristotle is the originator of this naïve concept of truth.2
To put it another way, we have three theses:
1. The place of truth is the proposition.
2. Truth is the correspondence of thought with beings.
3. These two statements originate with Aristotle.
These three theses, which are widespread today and have been for a long time, are so many prejudices. It is not the case that Aristotle enunciated the first two theses, nor does he directly or indirectly teach what these theses assert. He originates theses (1) and (2) only in the sense that these came into circulation through an appeal to Aristotle that was based on an inadequate interpretation of him; and it continues unabatedly, even today, to determine the conception of the problem.
What does Aristotle say about truth and its relation to λόγoς as proposition?
In the first place, we must keep in mind the basic point: Aristotle never determined “truth” as such by going back to the proposition. Rather, if he ever makes any connection between λόγoς (proposition) and truth, he does so in such a way that he determines the proposition through [129] truth, or more precisely, through the ability-to-be-true. But even this way of putting it is inadequate. The propositional statement is determined by Aristotle as speech that can be true or false.
ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός . . . ἀποφαντικὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει. (De interpretatione 4, 17a1–3)
All speech is about something {i.e., in general terms, it means something} . . . but not all speech is indicative {i.e., lets something be seen}, but only
2. See H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles (1896), vol. 1, pp. 13–14. The “concept of truth” has its “proper field of action” in the judgment—this [concept of truth] is the “original” one. The truth of perception and representation is a “derived” and “altered” concept of truth.