enough, then one day "Da-sein" could be "discovered" in this extant being.
What ensues from this presumption then is that one contrasts this presupposed and one-sided "anthropology" with other anthropologies, and tracks down the author's personal presuppositions and valuations and tolerates the whole thing perhaps as the peculiarity which "in its time", that is, in the supposedly questionable 14 years, could only once become possible under the influence of the "metropolitan" conception of man.
Having in this way put together from all sides the 'one-sidedness' and 'limitations' of the standpoint of Sein und Zeit, one believes oneself to be finished with this work before one could succeed to enter even the remotest sphere of that unique question in whose purview the stages of this work are thought and said.
[G328] Da-sein is the historical ground of the clearing of be-ing - a ground that is en-owned from out of en-owning.
Da-sein is the reticent counter-resonance of the tune of en-owning as inabiding the stillness wherein what is of ownhood, [das Eigentümliche] is en-owned in its ownhood and beings are decided to pay tribute to be-ing.
Da-sein is to be grounded only as inabiding the en-ownment of enowning, that is, from out of be-ing. Therefore, any attempt at grasping Da-sein predominantly or even exclusively with a view towards man remains inadequate. The Da-sein is equally fundamental for god and is equally fundamentally determined by the relation to the world and the earth which preserve their swaying ownhood in Da-sein. Nevertheless, the relation of Da-sein to man in the sense of an 'owning-to, and hinting' mindfulness and naming has a preeminence that requires that the immediate projecting-open of Da-sein goes through man (see Sein und Zeit). But precisely hereby man is already in advance no longer thought anthropologically, that is, metaphysically, but rather is grasped from out of his 'understanding of being' which unfolds itself as the guardianship of the truth of be-ing. In this vein, right from the beginning, and in contrast to the entirety of metaphysics, every 'dis-humanization' of man through his mere self-assertion (the subjectivity) is overcome.
If man is no longer the "image" of the Judea-Christian creator-God, does it follow from this that he is then the image of himself? Not at all! Especially not, when the relation to be-ing — the inabiding the truth of be-ing — makes up the swaying ground of man. The only conclusion to be initially drawn for be-ing-historical thinking is this: man is not at all the image of an other [Andere], but he has his most, indeed his distinctly ownmost, by virtue of his relation to be-ing. The 'own-ness' [Eigenheit] of