¶2: But those ontic properties are not the same as the stone’s present ontological status once I assign it to be an ersatz mallet. The German is: “Die Dienlichkeit (Verweisung) aber als Zeugverfassung ist auch keine Geeignetheit eines Seienden, sondern die seinsmäßige Bedingung der Möglichkeit dafür, daß es durch Geeignetheiten bestimmt sein kann,” that is: The being of a tool [Zeugverfassung] consists in it being assigned as serviceable for a task [Dienlichkeit (Verweisung)]. It is in terms of that serviceability—the fact that I need something to serve as means for doing this particular task—that I decide what is a suitable means and what is not.
In the example in this paragraph, the stone becomes a tool only when I decide to use it for that task; and it ceases to be a tool when I throw it away after using it. This points once again to the important issue of the phenomenological correlation. For something to actually be a tool (= das Gehalt), someone has to enact its usefulness as a tool (= der Vollzug). Thus, the relation of a tool to a task is an assigned relation, enacted by a human being.
¶3: [the stone] has to be “freed up” from just-there-ness; and that freeing-up is ultimately what lets the stone be a means to an end. The German is “darauf es je schon zunächst freigegeben ist. Mit ihm als Seiendem hat es je eine Bewandtnis,” that is: The stone has to be “freed up” for its being, and [when it is freed up] it becomes the means [mit ihm] in a means-end relation. — On “mit ihm” as referring to the means and “bei etwas” as referring to the end, see Prenote 3 above.
¶3: a possibility and purpose of mine: spending the night comfortably. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics I 8, 1098b20–21: to eu zēn, and Politics III 9, 1280b33: hē tou eu zēn koinōnia.
¶3: all my actions are ultimately for the sake of ex-sisting. These last three English sentences may be parsed out as follows.
| Dieses primäre Wozu ist kein Dazu als mögliches Wobei einer Bewandtnis. | Moreover, ex-sistence is not a means to a further end that lies beyond itself. |
| Das primäre “Wozu” ist ein Worum-willen. | It is the ultimate purpose of all human activity. |
| Das “Um-willen” betrifft aber immer das Sein des Daseins, dem es in seinem Sein wesenhaft um dieses Sein selbst geht. | My ex-sistence is what I am always concerned about, and all my actions are ultimately for the sake of exsisting. |
Re acting for the sake of ex-sisting: Cf. Aquinas, S.T. II-II 64, 2, ad 3: “Homo est naturaliter liber et propter seipsum existens” (a human being is by nature free and exists for him- or herself) and, in the ex-sistentiel register, Kant: “So act that you use humanity,