real, in contrast to the concrete things of this constantly changing world. As Heidegger puts it:
Overwhelmed, as it were by the essence, Plato understood εἶδος [the intelligible appearance of the whatness of a thing] as something independently present and therefore as something common (κοινόν) to the individual “things” that “stand in such an appearance.” In this way individuals, as subordinate to the ἰδέα taken as what properly is, were displaced into the role of non-things.66
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Aristotle likewise carries over into his own philosophy the connotation of οὐσία as steadfast stability and staying power, but he radically changes the paradigm within which he uses οὐσία. He, too, investigates the stable reality of things: for example, he speaks of things as συνιστάμενα and συνεστῶτα, that which has taken a stand.67 Contrary to Plato, however, Aristotle’s vision of the world valorizes motion and change as ἐνέργεια τίς68—as real in their own way. “Real” admits of degrees.69 Aristotle recognizes the reality of the as-yet-incomplete, and he affirms what is incomplete as real to the degree that it appears (cf. εἶδος) and makes sense to us (cf. τὸ ὂν λεγόμενον). He valorizes the radiance and effulgence (δόξα: the shining appearance) of something even when it is still in the process of striving for the full perfection of its essence. Aristotle understands movement as always for the sake of a goal; whatever is in movement strives for full appearance and stable constancy.70 His genius was to see the “not-yet” dimension of something in motion as “im-perfect” (ad perfectionem) in the sense of being on the way to perfection or fulfillment.71
This expression [“imperfection”] is not purely and simply negative but is negative in a particular way. That which we designate as imperfect does not have nothing at all to do with perfection. On the contrary, it is precisely oriented
66. GA 9: 275.19–25 = 210.27–31.
67. Physics II 1, 192b13 and 193a36.
68. Physics III 2, 201b31.
69. GA 34: 33.16–18 = 26.5: “Das Seiende hat ebenfalls Grade! Seiend und seiend ist nicht ohne weiteres dasselbe.”
70. What Aristotle says about the nutritive faculty applies to all movement. De anima III 9, 432b15–16: ἀεί τε γὰρ ἕνεκά του ἡ κίνησις αὕτη: This movement [of nutrition] is always for the sake of something [viz., its τέλος]. See On the Parts of Animals I 1, 640a18: ἡ γὰρ γένεσις ἕνεκα τῆς οὐσίας ἐστίν: Coming-to-be is for the sake of actually being. Topics VI 2, 139b20: ἡ γένεσις ἀναγωγὴ εἰς οὐσίαν: Becoming is the bringing of something into being.
71. See Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis IV, distinctio 47, quaestio 2, articulus 2, quaestiuncula 1, corpus: “motus, qui est via ad perfectionem.” http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/snp4047.html.