St. John's College (Annapolis) Lectures
The ‘hidden secret of our essence' is the ‘having-been' that is still within us and is us, fabricated as we are piece by piece from alien forms, and fabricating as we do piece by piece new forms.
Three planks tabulated.
Original PDF version.
Heidegger acknowledged that to think that evil dwells in the essence of being represented a challenge.
8 October 1934 – 2 August 2022
Inasmuch as Dasein through its transcendence implicitly projects or lets be the open realm in which beings may be encountered, Dasein implicitly philosophizes.
Original PDF version.
What is at issue is not the difference between modern and classical science, but that between Western thinking and its forgotten origin.
The space of possibilities of meaningful presence — die Lichtung — is one such bubble within the larger bubble that is life — the space of possibilities of organisms — within the rather larger bubble that is our particular universe, a bubble within eternal inflation.
The Monist, Vol. 66, No. 3, Categories (JULY, 1983), pp. 387-409
Not only is the distinction between the ontological categories of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand intelligible only in terms of the sort of Being that Dasein has, but the difference between Dasein's sort of being and readiness-to- and presentness-at-hand must itself be understood in terms of Dasein.
That being conceals itself, that world effaces itself, and that the clearing surreptitiously holds back other possibilities are all modes of concealing that obtain simultaneously with the unconcealing in question. They are all also modes of self-concealing in one way or another, whether what is concealed is the unconcealment, the unconcealing or the concealment itself.
Original PDF version.
[T]o think this beginning in a way that captures its originary, inceptive dimension is to come to understand being in a way different from yet underlying the Greek beginning and its understanding of being (Sein) as φύσις. It is, in other words, to understand be-ing (Seyn) as the historical grounding of the meaning of being and its difference from beings, i.e., as the ground that constitutes and thus appropriates to itself the essential correlation of that meaning and human understanding of it.
New book
There is much to be said about being’s shining out and its various modes, as well as about disclosing and how it is correlated with being as a dimension of third-plank unconcealing (i.e., das Ereignis). Indeed, there is much to be said about worlding, which is a way of thinking third-plank unconcealing that receives comparatively little attention in Heidegger’s corpus. There is presumably also more to be said about being’s self-concealing—not only about the fact that being conceals itself but also about how we experience and express that self-concealing.
MOREAll of which leaves us with the classic Heideggerian question: the Grundmerismus discloses a fundamental difference—in what dimension is that difference embedded? What subtends the distinction between ontotheology and finitude, that from which the two emerge in their difference?
Heidegger’s last letter.
Conference
The conference will explore and discuss Martin Heidegger’s reading and reception of Friedrich Nietzsche’s ideas.
New book
The “first inception” among the ancient Greeks glimpsed Being as pure giving and granting, and the “other inception,” which is breaking in upon human beings in the present time, retrieves the first inception and brings into fresh language the giving, letting, appropriating character of Beyng itself, namely, as Ereignis.
MOREOriginal PDF.
If art involves an ontological determination, then this is to insist that a time-space of unconcealment is not only opened up in the conflict between world and Earth but that what Heidegger designates as “the truth of being” happens historically in ontical creations that are stationed in the midst of beings to set a standard for their appearance as phenomena.
Where Heidegger speaks of the inquiry into the meaning of being as the most basic and concrete of questions, Hussed agrees, but he comments in the margin that this is a "transcendental-phenomenological question" about the constitutive meaning of being.
As Heidegger puts it, the fact that something is not this or that is what constitutes that thing’s being.
§ 7 of the paraphrastic translation in the Being and Time app updated.
The point is that Heidegger approaches ontology in terms of movement rather than things,that the main movement he is concerned with is that of life, and that early on, life is conceived not merely as the temporal movement of human Dasein, but in a wider sense to include both humans and other living things.
6 Aug 1943 — 11 May 2022
Translated by
Being-in-itself is dependent on the human being insofar as being always already shelters within itself the clearing of essencing that is safeguarded by the human essence, but in such a way that this human essence itself belongs to the essence ofbeing, from which that being-in-itself comes forth.
and
New book
The religious and spiritual resonance of Heidegger’s language is unmistakable. His language of “the holy” as “the source” and “the gladsome” that pours forth “light” and abiding “joy” for humans and for all beings is a religious and spiritual language—which certainly has metaphysical and theological implications.
MORE'House in general' is ontologically prior to houses; a history of houses might be attempted but 'house in general' has no history, it always already was, it pre-exists houses.
[O]ne repays a teacher badly if one remains a student or a follower much less an acolyte, reflecting that the teacher has, just in order to be a teacher, to withdraw as such[.]
What shows up within the clearing and thus is understandable becomes actually understood when it is taken as having such-and-such a meaning (Bedeutung), whether that meaning is correct or not—the way, for example, an Athenian juror in 399 BCE might take Socrates to be a threat to the city-state.
Translated by
For the truth of our Dasein is no simple thing.
In both texts space is understood as opened: in Contributions as an empty between-space, and in Agchibasié as an opened landscape (Gegend).
Beyng as event serves as a ground for many things, including Dasein and the worlds in which we encounter other beings. But the nature of this grounding can be rather unclear.
I would like to take seriously the possibility that Heidegger was attempting to understand the Nothing on its own terms. This was, to be sure, a path Heidegger did not follow for long. But one of its forks leads to a destination that Heidegger would arrive at only in the mid-1930s, albeit by way of a different route.
Turner’s Überschreitung aims at understanding biological being as a structure of existence in Heidegger’s sense; it seeks to establish and determine the structures of being-in-the-world in non-human biota.
The work of art, and in fact world in tension with earth, are seen as an event of aletheia, Heidegger’s term for truth as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) (GA5: 21).
The most complete document of this kind yet.
Ereignis is not an event at all, not even “the event of appropriation.”
Heidegger asserts that lógos pseudēs, a distorting lógos, is possible “only if nonbeings can be (237a2)” (GA 19, 410/284). So, the question of falsehood, on his reading, concerns both the ontological status of ψεῦδος, i.e. the being of non-beings, and the structure of lógos itself.
The act of drinking the wine Heidegger describes as conditional, making the jug a thing that is located in the place where it functions not as just another jug but a jug of that place.
Traditional hero that Wendy is, ἄτη is at hand to snare her into tragedy.
[B]oth Schürmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the “annihilation” and “extinction” of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencing—nothing more, nothing less.
This is the HTML version of a paper in Gatherings 2017. The original PDF file is on the Heidegger Circle web site.
[T]he singer can seem to echo Heidegger’s insight into the ancient goddess of truth herself, Aletheia, tacked between the marvels of perspective, and we remember, as Lacan tells us, as Nietzsche has told us, that truth rises naked from the depths, as the ancients depict her, with a mirror in her hand.
To be in love is said here to be in the love, to be in Eros and understood as the same as being urged to experience the most proper meaning of existence.
With contributions from: Scott M. Campbell, Lee Braver, Morganna Lambeth, Richard Polt, Harri Mäcklin, Jussi Backman, John J. Preston, David Liakos, Iain Thomson, Katherine Ward, William Blattner, Megan Altman, Carolyn Culbertson, and Timothy Quinn
Asking the question of Being (and, drawing our attention to this question is his significant contribution) is an important addition to, but can never replace, asking moral questions in the spirit of rationality and freedom.
In Heidegger's path from transcendental philosophy through "thinking," Žižek would argue that Heidegger should have stuck with transcendentalism.
Maybe Heidegger, relegating Nietzsche to the Roman, gains for himself the chance to claim the Greek other beginning. If so, the Alemannic and the local betray some of his ambitions, the fox, as Hannah Arendt spoke of him, pointing to physiognomic traits evident in the younger man, still present as Heidegger aged.
By standing outside her Being in the truth of Being, the human preserves the essence of her Being.
What, viewed from a Heideggerian and early-Greek standpoint, [Gestell] suppresses, is, in the case of all non-human-made things, what we are willing to call their “translucent phenomenality,” i.e. their translucent-ness to “being” – their auto-poietic shining forth into the region of the unconcealed.
Original PDF.
We have always already “suffered” the burden of thrown-openness as the clearing. No prior agent has acted upon ex-sistence, forced facticity upon us, thrown us into being-needed for the sake of intelligibility at all.
[W]hat is sought is an understanding of freedom not as a foundation for being, in the sense of its ultimate explicability, but rather as the neutral event through which Dasein is situated before and amongst beings.
[B]oth social and cultural revolutions have driven the larger ‘human revolution’, or the general process of hominization along its trajectory towards ‘we moderns’. Such revolutions are necessary to fore-ground the Upper Palaeolithic record where local styles and time-space cultures are identifiable.
Thinking that is the not yet, that happens as the not yet of itself, has always anticipated the present.
Entschlossenheit is not altogether for keeps: "Dasein is already in [Unentschlossenheit], and soon, perhaps, will be in it again." Yet in the phrase Gaddis puts to various uses semper aliquid haeret, a bit always sticks (flesh to soul, tell to fake, shit to heel); authentic Entschlossenheit "resolves to keep repeating itself;" a glimpse of 'radical opened-upness' sticks in the Sein.
The fundamental concept of teshuva makes room for thought, delineating a horizon in which it ultimately would be possible to illuminate the very event of “thinking”, as it unfolds in Heidegger’s efforts.
Heidegger’s “originary ethics” must derive its directive, its normativity, its point of reference, hence its measure, from the questioning of being—from our thoughtful exposure to the ontological dimensionality into which that questioning throws us.
Heidegger kept unaltered his differentiated assessment of the Christian experience and its philosophical-theological interpretation. Religion as such constitutes a fundamental possibility of human existence, in the form of myth, as opposed to philosophy.
Wherever we locate the power, the claim is that the play first opens the Greek – and so Western – understanding of being (as uncanny, and so as φύσις) and of the human being as open to being and able to stand authentically towards it.
The Heideggerian “questioning” is already a way of responding, and the politico-magical efficacy of the invocation of being makes up for the “fundamentally” unsteady character of the intellectual construction: being is a nonhuman and anthropomorphic figure.
The 'outside' world is not for us what we see, just because it is out there. It's made from what we take care about, what's of interest to us. The things that are of no interest in us and are out there, are for us a residue, a waste product, compared to things that we have an interest in.
Here Schürmann undertakes the reflective question, underway to be sure towards the event, the inception of Ereignis: “What, then, is it that already holds us? Nothing other than the post-principial economy made possible by technology as the completion of metaphysics.”
[W]hen Heidegger insists that the essence of Technik is not itself technisch, it may well be that the essence of techne is to be thought through an invocation of a movement of nihilism, in this double sense of a covering up of exactly that to which Heidegger is trying to draw attention.
So from (Wer & Was) – beings – we get (Sein & (Wer & Was)) – being and beings, the ‘narrow’ ontological difference. Thence (Lichtung & (Sein & (Wer & Was))) – the ‘broad’ ontological difference between the clearing and being-and-beings.
The philosophers must return to the cave not only in order to save the polis, but also in order to understand the political realm in its particularity after spending time in the light of the intelligible forms.
The projection and configuring of possibility belongs, rather to Being itself as such, as a happening to which Dasein (or the Being of the human being) is exposed in advance – an antecedent happening or “event” (Ereignis) that “destines” Being in this or that historical manner.
The combined texts of GA 45, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, and 73 are a total of 5242 pages. Seven volumes written in German by Heidegger (and a few pages of editors and translator notes). Five volumes of English translations. The combined total of indexed words adds up to 60,309 words.
[T]he Gestell of technology can only enable global capital because, using Heidegger’s account of mathematics, economics is already embedded in the origin of the history of metaphysics
The πόλις is thus not political, but is that from which all that is human takes place (which is what history is), including and especially that which we call political. Thus our understanding of politics presupposes the πόλις and not the other way around.
In 1935 Heidegger very clearly credited the entire philosophical tradition – not just as far back as Plato, but including the Presocratics – with asking about entities as such and as a whole, which is to say, entities in their being. This is why in 1935 he was able to slide so easily back and forth between saying on one page that φύσις means “being itself” and on the very next page that it means “entities as such and as a whole”.
Heidegger sees in Aristotle here the last echo of the pre-Socratic insight that being is φύσις, since φύσις is not simply the imposition of form onto matter, but rather their primary and appropriate belonging together. Matter is formed in φύσις with an appropriateness that is not merely an ordering of what is on hand the way an artist organizes material into the work.
“Also, movement—just as time—is holding itself together in itself according to its ontological sense. Accordingly, time is either the same as movement or a how in the manner of Being of movement.”
| Text | Page |
|---|---|
| The Principle of Reason | 38 |
| Pathmarks "Letter on 'Humanism'" | 269 |
| Poetry Language Thought "...Poetically Man Dwells..." | 211 |
| Nietzsche II "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" | 211 |
| Being and Time | 262 |
| Basic Writings "The Question Concerning Technology" | 311 |
| Heraclitus Seminar | 161 |
| Basic Questions of Philosophy | 134 |
| Four Seminars "Le Thor 1969" | 61 |
| Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) | 278 |
Heidegger is a process philosopher. Heidegger and Whitehead share a deep suspicion of the notion of “substance,” in regard to which Whitehead develops Hume’s Buddhist critique while Heidegger develops Nietzsche’s.
| Author | Document |
|---|---|
| Thomas Sheehan | Heidegger: The Three Meanings of ἀλήθεια |
| Eric D. Meyer | Review: Freedom to Fail by Peter Trawny |
| Franco Volpi | Dasein as Praxis |
| Thomas Sheehan | What does Heidegger mean by “time”? |
| Jeffrey Rubard | The Torso of Humanity |
| Eric D. Meyer | Apostrophe of Difference |
| Doug Wise | Dolores hears a Who |
| Patricia Glazebrook | Heidegger and Vandana Shiva |
| James M. Magrini | Die Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger’s Phenomenological Ontology |
| Eric D. Meyer | The Task of the Translator, or, How To Speak To Martin Heidegger’s Texts |
| Andrew Mitchell | What Is Called Drinking? |
| Doug Wise | Heidegger, Freud, and the other clearing |
| Doug Wise | Heidegger and Darwin |
| Richard Capobianco | Heidegger on Hebel |
| Thomas Sheehan | Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud Into Philosophy? |
| Thomas Sheehan | L’affaire Faye: Faut-il brûler Heidegger? |
| William J. Richardson | Heidegger and the Problem of World |
| Doug Wise | Some natural history of sense-making |
| Doug Wise | Daseintropy |
| Doug Wise | On the essence of μύσται |
| Text | Page |
|---|---|
| Vorträge und Aufsätze "Das Ding" | 182 |
| Platon: Sophistes | 17 |
| Zur Sache des Denkens "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens" | 85 |
| Seminare | 262 |
| Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges "Was ist das Sein selbst?" | 424 |
| Sein und Zeit | 220 |
| Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit | 527 |
| Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz | 234 |
| Vorträge und Aufsätze "Bauen Wohnen Denken" | 152 |
| Zum Ereignis-Denken | 758 |
Deconstraint is also the key notion in Heidegger’s analysis of the concepts ‘poor in world’ and ‘world-forming.’ Deconstraint is particular and local in the former and general and global in the latter. Radical deconstraint in the dimension of ‘taking-as’ distinguishes human being from the rest of the biota.
Mortals are oriented toward the entities that show up, not toward their showing up (Being) as such, and certainly not toward the clearing that allows for such showing up.
I did another annual sweep for dead links on Ereignis. The most common problem were hyperlinks that don't respond at all; the machine at the other end is gone. I remove those items from Ereignis. In some cases the institution (.edu or .org) or publisher (.com) still exists, but they've adopted a new scheme, and the link to the person or book returns not-found. In those cases, I just remove the hyperlink and leave the announcement.
Article in the International Encyclopedia of Ethics
For Aristotle, φρόνησις was different from τέχνη, because the goal of the latter is something external to action, while the former involves the active life of the soul itself. Heidegger saw this element of Aristotle’s thought as important for advancing non-scientific forms of truth and preparing a model for the being of Dasein, in non-subjective, world-disclosive terms. The fact that Aristotle focused this discussion of truth on the virtues of the soul allows an avenue for exploring a robust sense of ethical virtue by way of Heidegger’s thought.
Heidegger claims that such an experience would not occur within the domain of beings, Seiendes (physics); it accordingly would not be of something particular, whether physiological or psychological. Nor, moreover, would it occur within the domain of the being, Sein, of beings(metaphysics); it accordingly would not be of something common to all entities, both physiological and psychological. Rather a proper experience of pain would be an experience on the order of being itself (Seyn), an experience that would “unsettle metaphysics at its core” and “transform the human being’s relation to truth”
Heidegger’s crucial paraphrase of Aristotle refers not to Dasein’s past in any sense but to its existential aheadness, its Zukünftigkeit or futurity. Dasein’s essence is to be always becoming itself, coming-to (zu-kommen) what it always already is: its mortal thrown-a-headness unto death.
I've added the paraphrastic translation at the end of this paper to §74 of the Being and Time App.
Contributors:
In “Entwicklung” Schumpeter specifies das Neue as discontinuity, a break with ‘before’: “The change transmuting one imprinted form [eine geprägte Form] into another one must represent a crack [Riß], a jerk [Ruck], or a leap [Sprung].”
GA links in progress.
New book
With contributions from: Jeff Malpas, Markus Wild, Tristan Moyle, Thomas Buchheim, Claudia Baracchi, Damir Barbarić, Jussi Backman, Nikola Mirkovic, Andrew J. Mitchell, Hans Ruin, and Sylvaine Gourdain.
MOREBook now available as a single page.
Translated by Pete Ferreira
The decade preceding the publication of Being and Time (1927), from the last years of the first period at Freiburg and the entire period in Marburg, is characterized in its speculative terrain by the strength with which, in engaging Aristotle, Heidegger puts into action this foundational intent. From a general point of view, it comes together as an urge for a truly radical philosophical knowledge, in the need to locate and determine the primary source from which it springs before it unfolds, and to which it later returns, the live wire of philosophizing.
[O]ur discussion does not set itself the task of winding up a fixed program. But it would like to prepare all who are participating for a gathering in which what we call the Being of being appeals to us. By naming this we are considering what Aristotle already says.
Τὸ ὄν λεγέται πολλαχῶς.
Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, August 1955.
New book
Beginning with Heidegger is an in-depth examination of the influence that Martin Heidegger’s inceptual thought exerted on Leo Strauss, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida and Alexander Dugin. How did these vastly different thinkers employ Heideggerian concepts to define their own philosophies and often antagonistic politics?
At its best, qualitative research works like a great poem, causing the reader to experience ‘evocation’ and to see the world through different eyes. Then a new horizon opens, and this process Heidegger describes as the ‘happening’ (Ereignis) of the truth.
[I]nsight is the essence of technology and down in the engine‐room is the impulse drive, the dopaminergic reward circuit.
We are an international network of 43 public philosophy groups with a combined membership of over 50,000 people. Our groups have held thousands of public philosophy events in total.
I am currently in two virtual Heidegger exegetical reading groups in my time zone; Basic Writings on the Discord D&GQC server (instructions for joining Friday's discussion) and Nietzsche 3-4 with the Phoenix Philosophy Meetup Group. Go live!
Profound boredom is in fact, for Heidegger, the mood connected to originary time; it can be said that through the setting forth of the earth in the dead time of L'eclisse we may become attuned into profound boredom.
An Index to Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) two printed volumes Zum Ereignis-Denken; Gesamtausgabe Volumes GA 73.1 and GA 73.2 (published in October 2013).
slows down and unclutters the time-space of our existence
No experience, no matter how ursprünglich, can disclose an embedding dimension of the distinction horizon/Open because all experience takes place only within and by virtue of the horizon/Open, sense-making, affective/cognitive ‘taking-as.’
It is one thing to say that a better account of life is found in Aristotle's Ethics than in post-Cartesian subjectivistic theories; it is quite another to say that philosophy itself is essentially phronesis. That is simply the obverse error of the theoretism it is supposed to replace.
Hence Heidegger’s famously eponymous recommendation to us that we use technology but without letting it "entangle" us. We are, that is to say, to employ technological devices and practices while detached from them, able to "let go of them any time", able in other words (and it is this that seemingly defies us today) to "let them alone".
Prior to 1934, Heidegger consistently interprets τέχνη as the know-how that pertains to handicraft; after 1934, Heidegger turns to τέχνη itself, and to his original blurring of τέχνη with φρόνησις, to find the possibility of a higher knowing that unifies them in a reconceived τέχνη.
By forming her response to Heidegger from the passages of his own text—but from a perspective distinct from his own—Irigaray puts into question the unarticulated ethical implications of his positive ontology. She ‘clears the ground’, to employ a Heideggerian motif, so that the “previously neglected powers” of his philosophy may be released.
In 1930 Heidegger gives untruth a special name, die Irre, ‘errancy.’ ... Because we ek-sist and in-sist by these systems we “already stand within errancy,” for the dynamics of these systems inherently produces error and illusion; Irre is constitutive of existence as a modality of sense-making.
The event of φύσις is as much the event of rising into unconcealment as that of suppressing into concealment; for all that comes forth into shining much remains left behind in oblivion.
Taking Heidegger’s proposals into consideration, we can ask: Do we need an alternative to presence as an understanding of being?
[H]ow Dasein responds to interruption is the key to its individuation: Whether the break itself is recognized as such and its questionability intensified or whether it is excluded as nonsense – as the “nothing” is habitually disclosed in average existence – or – like death – integrated into the identity of everydayness.
The polemos, rather than the idea, captures what Heidegger believes is most important about human existence: that it is finite, connected to a specific tradition rather than the universal; that it is temporal rather than linked to the eternal, be it the forms, God, or secularized versions of these, such as human rights; and that it is historical rather than an abstraction based on generalized characteristics of human nature.
The crucial point, as Heidegger emphasizes, is not to trace Verstehen down to the innermost constitution of transcendence, but to note its “essential unity” with “finding oneself …” (my translation of Befindlichkeit) and with “thrownness.”
To see the gleam or hear the ‘pure noise’ of meaning requires the occurrence of some mode of ma, a darkness or a stillness, a rift in the continuum of Bedeutsamkeit.
Translate one with circumspection during the corona circumscription.
Heidegger did not think that fundamental ontology was a strict departure from, or replacement for, the Western philosophical tradition. The meaning of being as he saw it was simply concealed within, and even implicit in, that tradition.
The difference between authentic and inauthentic choice appears to rest in the extent of freedom for repurposing, redirecting, and so on. Whereas inauthentic choice takes the inherited possibilities as simply given ‘in themselves’ for reactualizing or not, authentic choice takes them as ‘empty,’ for reinterpreting and refabricating to cope with one’s thrown circumstances.
In Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger also acknowledges that his speaking of ‘human Dasein’ in Being and Time and elsewhere had been misleading – since it suggested there might be another kind of Dasein, e.g., animal or plant Dasein. In fact, only human beings can be Dasein.